Privacy concerns in outsourced cloud databases have become more and more important recently and many efficient and scalable query processing methods over encrypted data have been proposed. However, there is very limited work on how to securely process top-k ranking queries over encrypted databases in the cloud. In this paper, we focus exactly on this problem: secure and efficient processing of top-k queries over outsourced databases. In particular, we propose the first efficient and provable secure top-k query processing construction that achieves adaptively IND-CQA security. We develop an encrypted data structure called EHL and describe several secure sub-protocols under our security model to answer top-k queries. Furthermore, we optimize our query algorithms for both space and time efficiency. Finally, in the experiments, we empirically analyze our protocol using real world datasets and demonstrate that our construction is efficient and practical.
Introduction
As remote storage and cloud computing services emerge, such as Amazon's EC2, Google AppEngine, and Microsoft's Azure, many enterprises, organizations, and end users may outsource their data to those cloud service providers for reliable maintenance, lower cost, and better performance. In fact, a number of database systems on the cloud have been developed recently that offer high availability and flexibility at relatively low costs. However, despite these benefits, there are still a number of reasons that make many users to refrain from using these services, especially users with sensitive and valuable data. Undoubtedly, the main issue for this is related to security and privacy concerns [3] . Indeed, data owner and clients may not fully trust a public cloud since some of hackers, or the cloud's administrators with root privilege can fully access all data for any purpose. Sometimes the cloud provider may sell its business to an untrusted company, which will have full access to the data. One approach to address these issues is to encrypt the data before outsourcing them to the cloud. For example, electronic health records (EHRs) should be encrypted before outsourcing in compliance with regulations like HIPAA 1 . Encrypted data can bring an enhanced security into the Database-As-Service environment [20] . However, it also introduces significant difficulties in querying and computing over these data.
In recent years, many works have been proposed for computing over encrypted data. In general, the main technical difficulty is to query an encrypted database without ever having to decrypt it. A number of techniques related to practical query processing over encrypted data have been proposed recently, including keyword search queries [41, 11, 13] , range queries [40, 22, 30] , k-nearest neighbor queries [45, 16, 47, 12] , as well as other aggregate queries. Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, although top-k queries are important query types in many database applications [23] , none of the existing works are applicable to solve the top-k queries securely and efficiently. For example, Wong et. al. [45] proposed an encryption scheme for knn queries and mentioned a method of transforming their scheme to solve top-k queries, however, as shown in [47] , their encryption scheme is not secure and is vulnerable to chosen plaintext attack. Vaiyda et. al. [43] also studied privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the data are vertically partitioned instead of encrypting the data. Here, we propose the first IND-CQA secure query processing technique over encrypted database that can answer ad-hoc top-k queries efficiently.
In this paper, we assume that the data owner and the clients are trusted, but not the cloud server. Therefore, the data owner encrypts each database relation R using some probabilistic encryption scheme before outsourcing it to the cloud. An authorized user specifies a query q and generates a trapdoor or token to query the server. Our objective is to allow the cloud securely compute the top-k results based on a user-defined ranking function over R, and, more importantly, the cloud shouldn't learn anything about R or q. Consider a real world example for a health medical database below: Example 1.1 An authorized doctor, Alice, wants to get the top-k results based on some ranking criteria from the encrypted electronic health record database patients (see Table 1 ). The encrypted patients database may contain several attributes; here we only list a few in One example of a top-k query (in the form of a SQL query) can be: SELECT * FROM patients ORDERED BY chol+thalach STOP AFTER k. That is, the doctor wants to get the top-2 results based the score chol + thalach from all the patient records. However, since this table contains very sensitive information about the patients, the data owner first encrypts the table and then delegates it to the cloud. So, Alice requests a key from the data owner and generates a query token based on the query. Then the cloud searches and computes on the encrypted table to find out the top-k results. In this case, the top-2 results are the records of patients David and Emma.
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Our secure protocol extends the No-Random-Access (NRA) [17] algorithm for computing top-k queries over a probabilistically encrypted relational database. Moreover, our query processing model assumes that two non-colluding semi-honest clouds, which is the model that has been widely adopted and been showed working well (see [16, 10, 33, 7, 9] ). We encrypt the database in such a way that the server can obliviously execute NRA over the encrypted database without learning the underlying data. This is accomplished with the help of a secondary cloud server (or Crypto Cloud). However, the encrypted database resides only in the primary cloud. During the query processing, we use several novel sub-routines that can securely compute the best/worst score and de-duplicate replicated data items over the encrypted database. Notice that these sub-protocols can be used as stand-alone building blocks for other applications as well. We also would like to point out that during the querying phase the computation performed by the client is very small. The client only needs to compute a simple token for the server and all of the relatively heavier computations are performed by the cloud side. Below we summarize our main contributions:
• We firstly propose a new practical protocol designed to answer top-k queries over encrypted data.
• We propose two encrypted data structures called EHL and EHL + which allow the servers to homomorphically evaluate the equality relations between two objects.
• We propose several independent sub-protocols such that the cloud can securely computes the best/worst scores and de-duplicate replicated encrypted objects with the use of another noncolluding server.
• We prove that our scheme is secure under the IND-CQA security definition and both of the data confidentiality and query privacy are protected.
• The scheme is experimentally evaluated using real-world datasets and result shows that our scheme is efficient and practical.
Related Works and Background
The problem of processing queries for the outsourced database is not new. The seminal paper [20] proposed executing SQL queries over encrypted data using bucketization. Since then, a number of works have appeared on executing various queries over encrypted data. One of the relevant problem related to top-k queries is the kNN (k Nearest Neighbor) queries. Note that top-k queries should not be confused with similarity search, such as kNN queries. For the kNN queries, one is interested in retrieving the k most similar objects over the database to a query object, where the similarity between two objects is measured over some metric space, for example the L 2 metric. Many works have been proposed to specifically solve the kNN queries on encrypted data, such as [45, 16, 47, 12] . A significant amount of works have been done for privacy preserving keyword search queries or boolean queries, such as [41, 13, 11] . Recent work [39] proposed a general framework for boolean queries of disjunctive normal form queries on encrypted data. In addition, many works have been proposed for range queries [40, 22, 30] . Other relevant works include privacy-preserving data mining [32, 44, 2, 25, 34] . Recent works in the cryptography community have shown that it is possible to perform arbitrary computations over encrypted data, using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [18] , or Oblivious RAM [19] . However, the performance overheads of such constructions are very high in practice, thus they're not suitable for practical database queries. Some recent advancements in ORAM schemes [38] show promises and can potentially used in certain environments. As mentioned, [43] is the only work that studied privacy preserving execution of top-k queries. However, their approach is mainly based on the k-anonymity privacy policies, therefore, it cannot extended to the encrypted databases. Recently, differential privacy (DP) [15] has emerged as a powerful model to protect against unknown adversaries with guaranteed probabilistic accuracy. However, here we consider the encrypted data in the outsourced model; moreover, we do not want our query answer to be perturbed by some noisy data, but we want our query result to be exact and encrypted. Kuzu et. al. [29] proposed a scheme that leverages DP and leaks obfuscated access statistics to enable efficient searching. Another approach has been extensively studied is order-preserving encryption [32, 4, 2] , which is the encryption scheme that preserve the order of the message. We note that, by definition, this scheme directly reveals the order of our the objects' ranks, thus do not satisfy our data privacy guarantee. Furthermore, [21] proposed a prototype for access control using deterministic proxy encryption, and other secure database system has been proposed by using embedded secure hardware, such as TrustedDB [6] and Cipherbase [5] .
Preliminaries

Problem Definition
Consider a data owner (DO) that has a database relation R of n objects, denoted by o 1 , . . . , o n , and each object o i has m attributes. For simplicity, we assume that all m attributes take numerical values. Thus, the relation R is an n × m matrix. The DO would like to outsource R to a third-party cloud S 1 that is completely untrusted. Therefore, DO encrypts R and sends the encrypted relation E(R) to the cloud. After that, any authorized client should be able to get the results of the top-k query over this encrypted relation directly from S 1 , by specifying k and a score function over the m (encrypted) attributes. We consider the monotone scoring (ranking) functions that are weighted linear combinations over all attributes, that is
, where each w i ≥ 0 is the user-specified weight for the i-th attribute and x i (o) is the local score (value) of the i-th attribute for object o. Note that, we consider the monotone linear function mainly because it is the most important and widely used score function on top-k queries [23] . The results of a top-k query are the objects with the highest k scores of F W values. For example, consider an authorized client, Alice, that wants to run a top-k query over the encrypted database E(R). Consider the following query: q = SELECT * FROM E(R) ORDER BY F W (·) STOP AFTER k; That is, Alice wants to get the top-k results based on her scoring function F W , for a specified set of weights. Alice first has to request the keys from the data owner, then generates a query token t q . Alice sends the t q to the cloud server. The cloud server storing the encrypted database E(R) processes the top-k query and sends the encrypted results back to Alice.
Our Architecture and Security Model
We consider the secure computation on the cloud under the semi-honest (or honest-but-curious) adversarial model. Furthermore, our model assumes the existence of two non-colluding semi-honest cloud servers, S 1 and S 2 , where S 1 stores the encrypted database E(R) and S 2 holds the secret keys and provides the crypto services. We refer the server S 2 as Crypto Cloud and assume S 2 resides in the cloud environment and is isolated to S 1 . The two parties S 1 and S 2 do not trust each other, and therefore, they have to execute secure computations on encrypted data. This model is not new and has already been widely used in the related areas, such as [16, 10, 33, 7, 9] and, as pointed out by those papers, we would like to emphasize these cloud services are typically provided by some prestigious technology companies, such as Amazon, Microsoft Azure, and Google, who have also commercial interests not to collude. When the server S 1 receives the query token, S 1 initiates the secure computation protocol with the Crypto Cloud S 2 . Figure 1 shows an overview of the architecture. Security Model. We adapt the security definition from the searchable encryption literature [11, 26, 13] , which have been widely accepted in the prior privacy preserving database query works. Intuitively, this security definition says that no efficient adversary can learn any partial information about the database or the queries, beyond what is explicitly allowed by a leakage function. This holds even for queries that are adversarial-influenced and generated adaptively. In this paper, we capture the security requirement using a game-based indistinguishability definition, which we refer as IND-CQA (Indistinguishability Chosen-Query-Attack). We choose the IND-CQA because it is more natural to our problem and better describes the security properties of our construction. Throughout the paper, the non-colluding clouds S 1 and S 2 are semi-honest adversarial servers. In our construction, S 1 and S 2 learn nothing about the data except a small amount of leakage that we explicitly describe. We give the details of the security definitions and proofs later in this paper. We would like to emphasize that, during the execution of the secure query processing, neither of the servers S 1 or S 2 can retrieve the original data.
Cryptographic Tools
Homomorphic Cryptosystem. The Paillier cryptosystem [35] is a semantically chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure public key encryption scheme. The message space M for the encryption is Z N , where N is a product of two large prime numbers p and q. For a message m ∈ Z N , we denote E pk (m) ∈ Z N 2 to be the encryption of m with the public key pk. When the key is clear in the text, we simply use E(m) to denote the encryption of m and D(c) to denote the decryption of a ciphertext c. The details of encryption and decryption algorithm can be found in [35] . It has the following homomorphism properties:
Our construction also relies on Damgård-Jurik(DJ) cryptosystem introduced by [14] , which is a generalization of Paillier encryption. The message space M expands to Z N s for s ≥ 1, and the ciphertext space is under the group Z N s+1 . As mentioned in [1] , this generalization has the special property that allows to doubly encrypt messages and uses the additive homomorphism of the inner encryption layer under the same secret key. In particular, let E 2 x denote an encryption of the DJ encryption for a message x ∈ Z N 2 (when s = 2) and E(x) is the normal Paillier encryption. Then, we have following property:
. Throughout this paper, we use ∼ to denote that the underlying plaintext under encryption E are the same, i.e. E(x) ∼ E(y) ⇒ x = y. We summarize the notation throughout this paper in Table 2 .
Encrypted Hash List of the object o EHL + (o) Efficient Encrypted Hash List of the object o , EHL and EHL + operations, see Section 5.
The data item in the ith sorted list
o's worst score (lower bound) at depth d 
The NRA algorithm [17] finds the top-k answers by exploiting only sorted accesses to the relation R. We opted to use this algorithm because it provides a scheme that leaks minimal information to the cloud server (since during query processing there is no need to access intermediate objects). We assume that each column (attribute) is sorted independently to create a set of sorted lists S. The set of sorted lists is equivalent to the original relation, but the objects in each list L are sorted in ascending order according to their local score (attribute value). After sorting, R contains m sorted lists, denoted
Each data item is a pair of object and the value as 
Scheme Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our scheme. The two non-colluding semi-honest cloud servers are denoted by S 1 and S 2 . Let SecTopK = (Enc, Token, SecQuery) be the secure top-k query scheme containing three algorithms Enc, Token and SecQuery. Enc(R) is the encryption algorithm that takes relation R as an input and outputs the encrypted relation E(R). The idea of Enc is to encrypt and permute the set of sorted lists for R, so that the server can execute a variation of the NRA algorithm using only sequential accesses to the encrypted data. To do this encryption, we design a new encryption data structures for the objects, called EHL. The Token algorithm takes a query q and produces a token for the query. The token serves as a trapdoor so that the cloud knows which list to access. Finally, SecQuery is the query processing algorithm that takes the token and securely computes top-k results based on the token. In particular, S 1 scans the encrypted data depth by depth for each targeted list, maintaining a list of encrypted top-k object ids per depth until there are k encrypted object ids that satisfy the NRA halting condition. During this process, S 1 and S 2 learns nothing about the underlying scores and objects. At the end of the protocol, the object ids can be reported to the client. As we discuss next, there are two options after that. Either the encrypted records are retrieved and returned to the client, or the client retrieves the records using a secure scheme (oblivious RAM [19, 38] ) that does not even reveal the location of the actual encrypted records. In the first case, the server can get some additional information by observing the access patterns, i.e. the encrypted results of different queries. However, there are schemes that address this access leakage [24, 29] and is beyond the scope of this paper. The second approach may be more expensive but is completely secure.
In the following sections, we first discuss the new encrypted data structures EHL and EHL + . Then, we present the three algorithms Enc, Token and SecQuery in more details.
Encrypted Hash List (EHL)
In this paper, we propose a new data structure called encrypted hash list (EHL) to encrypt each object. The main purpose of this structure is to allow the cloud to homomorphically compute equality between the objects, whereas it is computationally hard for the server to figure out what the objects are. Intuitively, the idea is that given an object o we use s secure key-hash functions HMAC to hash the object o into a binary list of length L and then encrypt all the bits in the list to generate EHL. Let EHL(o) be the encrypted list of an object o and let EHL(o) [i] denote the ith encryption in the list. In particular, we initialize an empty list EHL of length L and fill all the entries with 0. Firstly, we generate s secure keys k 1 , ..., k s . The object o is hashed to a list as follows: It is obvious to see that the lemma 5.1 holds since the bits in the EHL are encrypted by the semantic secure Paillier encryption. Given EHL(x) and EHL(y), we define the randomized operation between EHL(x) and EHL(y) as follows:
where each r i is some random value in Z N .
Lemma 5.2 Let E(b) = EHL(x) EHL(y).
Then the plaintext b = 0 if x = y (two objects are the same), otherwise b is uniformly distributed in the group Z N with high probability.
Proof Sketch: Let E(x i ) = EHL(x) [i] and E(y i ) = EHL(y) [i] . If x = y, i.e. they are the same objects, then for
In the case of x = y, it must be true, with high probability, that there exists
e. the underlying bit at location i in EHL(x) is different from the bit in EHL(y).
. Therefore, the following holds:
Hence, based on the definition , it follows that b become random value uniformly distributed in the group Z N .
False Positive Rate. Note that the construction is indeed a probabilistically encrypted Bloom Filter except that we use one list for each object and encrypt each bit in the list. The construction of EHL may report some false positive results for its operation, i.e. E(0) ← EHL(x) EHL(y) when x = y. This is due to the fact that x and y may be hashed to exactly the same locations using s many HMAC's. Therefore, it is easy to see that the false positive rate (FPR) is the same as the FPR of the Bloom Filter, where we can choose the number of hash functions HMAC s to be L n ln 2 to minimize the false positive rate to be ( 
To reduce the false positive rate, we can increase the length of the list L. However, this will increase the cost of the structure both in terms of space overhead and number of operations for the randomization operation which is Ø(L). In the next subsection, we introduce a more compact and space-efficient encryption data structure EHL + .
EHL + . We now present a computation-and space-efficient encrypted hash list EHL + . The idea of the efficient EHL + is to first 'securely hash' the object o to a larger space s times and only encrypt those hash values. Therefore, for the operation , we only homomorphically subtract those hashed values. The complexity now reduces to Ø(s) as opposed to Ø(L), where s is the number of the secure hash functions used. We show that one can get negligible false positive rate even using a very small s. To create an EHL + (o) for an object o, we first generate s secure keys k 1 , ..., k s , then initialize a list
This step maps o to an element in the group Z N , i.e. the message space for Paillier encryption. Then set EHL
+ (x) and EHL + (y) are similar defined as in Equation (1), i.e.
where each r i is some randomly generated value in Z N . Similarly, EHL + has the same properties as EHL.
We now analyze the false positive rate (FPR) for EHL + . The false positive answer occurs when
Assuming HMAC is a Pseudo-Random Function, the probability of such happens ≤ N s . Notice that N ≈ 2 λ is large number as N is the product of two large primes p and q in the Paillier encryption and λ is the security parameter. For instance, if we set N to be a 256 bit number (128-bit primes in Paillier) and set s = 4 or 5, then the F P R is negligible even for millions of records. In addition, the size of the EHL + much smaller than EHL as it stores only s encryptions. In the following section, we simply refer EHL as implementation of encrypted hash list using the EHL + structure.
Notation. We introduce some notation that we use in our construction. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x s ) ∈ Z s N and the encryption E(x) denotes the concatenation of the encryptions E(x 1 )...E(x s ). Also, we denote the operation between E(x) and EHL(y) by the block-wise multiplication, that is c ← E(x) EHL(y), where
Database Encryption
We describe the database encryption procedure Enc in this section. Given a relation R with M attributes, the data owner first encrypts the relation in the following Algorithm 1.
In the E(R), each data item
. Besides the size of the database and M , the encrypted E(R) doesn't reveal anything. In Theorem 6.1, we demonstrate this by showing that two encrypted databases are indistinguishable if they have the same size and number of attributes.
Theorem 6.1 Given two relations R 1 and R 2 with |R 1 | = |R 2 | and same number of attributes. The encrypted E(R 1 ) and E(R 2 ) output by the algorithm Enc are indistinguishable.
The proof is straight forward as it's easy to see that the theorem holds based on lemma 5.1 and Paillier encryption scheme. 
Encrypt EHL(o d i ) using the secret keys k 1 , . . . , k s .
6:
Encrypt E(x d i ) using pk p .
7:
Store the item E(I
Generate a secret key K for a pseudorandom permutation g and permute the list L g(K,i) . 9: The data owner D securely uploads the keys pk p , sk p to the S 2 , and only pk p to S 1 . Output the encrypted relation as E(R).
Query Token
Consider the SQL-like query q = SELECT * FROM E(R) ORDERED BY F W (·) STOP BY k, where F W (·) is a weighted linear combination of all attributes. In this paper, to simplify our presentation of the protocol, we consider binary weights and therefore the scoring function is just a sum of the values of a subset of attributes. However, notice that for real-valued weights the client should provide these weights to the server and the server can simply adapt the same techniques by using the scalar multiplication property of the Paillier encryption before it performs the rest of the protocol which we discuss next. The Token algorithm is quiet simple and works as follows: the client specifies the scoring attributes set M of size m, i.e. |M| = m ≤ M , then requests the key K from the data owner, where K is the key corresponds the Pseudo-Random Permutation g. Then the client computes the g(K, i) for each i ∈ M and sends the following query token to the cloud server S 1 :
8 Secure Top-k Query Processing
As mentioned, our query processing protocol is based on the NRA algorithm. However, the technical difficulty is to execute the algorithm on the encrypted data while S 1 does not learn any object id or any score and attribute value of the data. We incorporate several cryptographic protocols to achieve this. Our query processing uses two state-of-the-art efficient and secure protocols: EncSort introduced by [7] and EncCompare introduced by [9] as building blocks. We skip the detailed description of these two protocols since they are not the focus of this paper. Here we only describe their functionalities: 1). EncSort: S 1 has a list of encrypted keyed-value pairs (E(k 1 ), E(a 1 ))...(E(k m ), E(a m )) and a public key pk, and S 2 has the secret key sk. At the end of the protocol, S 1 obtains a list new
, where the keyed-value list is sorted based on the order
EncCompare(E(a), E(b)): S 1 has a public key pk and two encrypted values E(a), E(b), while S 2 has the secret key sk. At the end of the protocol, S 1 obtains the bit f such that f := (a ≤ b). Several protocols have been proposed for the functionality above. We choose the one from [9] mainly because it is efficient and perfectly suits our requirements.
Query Processing: SecQuery
We first give the overall description of the top-k query processing SecQuery at a high level. Then, we describe in details the secure sub-routines that we use in the query processing: SecWorst, SecBest, SecDedup and SecUpdate.
As mentioned, SecQuery makes use of the NRA algorithm but is different from the original NRA, because SecQuery cannot maintain the global worst/best scores in plaintext. Instead, SecQuery has to run secure protocols depth by depth and homomorphically compute the worst/best scores based on the items at each depth. It then has to update the complete list of encrypted items seen so far with their global worst/best scores. At the end, server S 1 reports k encrypted objects (or object ids) without learning any object or its scores.
In particular, upon receiving the query token t q = SELECT * FROM E(R) ORDERED BY {L g(K,i) } i∈M STOP BY k, the cloud server S 1 begins to process the query. The token t q contains {L g(K,i) } i∈M which informs S 1 which lists to perform the sequential access. By maintaining an encrypted list T , which includes items with their encrypted global best and worst scores, S 1 updates the list T depth by depth. Let T d be the state of the encrypted list T after depth d. At depth d, S 1 first securely (homomorphically) computes the local encrypted worst/best scores for each item appearing at this depth by running SecWorst and SecBest. Then S 1 securely replaces the duplicated encrypted objects with large encrypted worst scores Z by running SecDedup. Next, S 1 updates the encrypted global list from state T d−1 to state T d by adapting SecUpdate. After that, S 1 utilizes EncSort to sort the distinct encrypted objects with their scores in T d to obtain the first k encrypted objects which are essentially the top-k objects based on their worst scores so far. The protocol halts if at some depth, the encrypted best score of the (k+1)-th object, E(B k+1 ), is less than the k-th object's encrypted worst score E(W k ). This can be checked by calling the protocol EncCompare(E(W k ), E(B k+1 )). We describe the detailed query processing in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Top-k Query Processing: SecQuery 1: S 1 receives Token from the client. Parses the Token and let
for each E(I
If |T d | < k elements, go to the next depth. Otherwise, run EncSort(T d ) by sorting on E(W i ), get first k items as T d k .
9:
Let the kth and the (k+1)th item be E(I k ) and E(I k+1 ), S 1 then runs f ← EncCompare(E(W k ), E(B k+1 )) with S 2 , where E(W k ) is the worst score for E(I k ), and E(B k+1 ) is the best score for E(I k+1 ) in T d .
10:
if f = 0 then
11:
Halt and return the encrypted first k item in T d k
Building Blocks
In this section, we present the detailed description of the protocols SecWorst, SecBest, SecDedup, and SecUpdate.
Secure Worst Score
At each depth, for each encrypted data item, server S 1 should obtain the encryption E(W ), which is the worst score based on the items at the current depth only. Note that this is different than the normal NRA algorithm as it computes the global worst possible score for each encountered objects until the current depth. We formally describe the protocol setup below: The technical challenge here is to homomorphically evaluate the encrypted score only based on the objects' equality relation. That is, if the object is the same as another o from L, then we add the score to E(W (o)), otherwise, we don't. We present the detailed protocol description of SecWorst in Algorithm 3 SecWorst : Secure Worst Score
Generate a random permutation π :
Permutate each
for each permuted item in E(I π(i) ) do 5:
Receive E 2 t i from S 2 and evaluate:
Set the worst score
12:
Generate r ∈ Z N , compute
Server S 2
13:
Decrypt as E(c + r), send it back Server S 1
14:
Receiving E(c + r), de-blind as E(c) = E(c + r) · E(r) −1 . Output E(c).
Algorithm 3.
Intuitively, the idea of SecWorst is that S 1 first generates a random permutation π and permutes the list of items in L. Then, it computes the E(b i ) between E(I) and each permuted E(I π(i) ), and sends E(b i ) to S 2 . The random permutation prevents S 2 from knowing the pair-wise relations between o and the rest of the objects o i 's. Then S 2 sends E 2 t i to S 1 (line 14). Based on Lemma 5.2, t i = 1 if two objects are the same, otherwise t i = 0.
. Based on the properties of DJ Encryption,
Therefore, it follows that
RecoverEnc is also used in other protocols). Finally, S 1 evaluates the following equation:
. S 1 can correctly evaluate the worst score, because that, when t i = 0, the object o i is not the same as o, otherwise, t i = 1. The following formula gives the correct computation of the worst score:
Secure Best Score
On the other hand, the secure computation for the best score is different from computing the worst score. Below we describe the protocol SecBest:
, SecBest securely computes the encrypted best score at the current depth, i.e. S 1 finally outputs E(B(o)), where B(o) is the best score for the o at current depth.
At depth d, let E(I) be the item in the list L j , then its best score up to this depth is based on the whether this item has appeared in other lists {L i } i =j . The detailed description for SecBest is described in Algorithm 4.
In SecBest, S 1 has to scan the encrypted items in the other lists to securely evaluate the current best score for the encrypted E(I). The last seen encrypted item in each sorted list contains the encryption of the best possible values (or bottom scores). If the same object o appears in the previous depth then homomorphically adds the object's score to the encrypted best score E(B), otherwise adds the bottom scores seen so far to E(B). In particular, S 1 can homomorphically evaluate (at line 8):
. If the item I does not appear in the previous depth, then ( 
i . Finally, S 1 homomorphically add up all the encrypted scores and get the encrypted best scores (line 10).
Algorithm 4 SecBest : Secure Best Score.
for each list L i do 3:
is the last encrypted item.
4:
for each permuted item E(I π(i) ) do
send E(b i ) to S 2 receive E 2 t i and compute: for E(b i ) received from S 1 do
13:
Decrypt to get b i . If b i = 0, set t i = 1, otherwise, set t i = 0. Send E 2 t i to S 1 .
Secure Deduplication
At each depth, some of the objects might be repeatedly computed since the same objects may appear in different sorted list at the same depth. S 1 cannot identify duplicates since the items and their scores are probabilistically encrypted. We now present a protocol that deduplicates the encrypted objects in the following.
Protocol 8.3
Assuming that S 1 has a list of encrypted items E(I 1 ), ..., E(I l ), and each item is associated with EHL(o i ), and its encrypted worst and best score E( 
14: Send π(B), {E(
randomly generate o i , and
Set
27: Generate a random permutation π : [l] → [l]. Permute new list E(I π (i)
) and H π (i) , then send them back to S 1 . Server S 1 :
30: Run and get E(Î
31: Output the encrypted list E(Î 1 )...E(Î l )
32: procedure Rand(E(I), α, β, γ) Blinds the plaintext 33: Let E(I) = (EHL(o), E(B), E(W )) Encrypt E(α), E(β), E(γ), and compute EHL(o) ← EHL(o) E(α), E(W ) ← E(W ) · E(β), E(B) ← E(B) · E(γ) 34: Output randomized results (EHL(o), E(W ), E(B))
Intuitively, at a high level, SecDedup let S 2 obliviously find the duplicated objects and its scores, and replaces the object id with a random value and its score with a large enough value Z = N −1 ∈ Z N (the largest value in the message space) such that, after sorting the worst scores, it will definitely not appear in the top-k list. The technical challenge here is to allow S 2 to find the duplicated objects without letting S 1 know which objects have been changed. The idea is to let the server S 1 send a encrypted permuted matrix B, which describes the pairwise equality relations between the objects in the list. S 1 then use the same permutation to permute the list of blinded encrypted items before sending it to S 2 . This prevents S 2 from knowing the original data. For the duplicated objects, S 2 replace the scores with a large enough encrypted worst score. On the other hand, after deduplication, S 2 also has to blind the data items as well to prevent S 1 from knowing which items are the duplicated ones. S 1 finally gets the encrypted items without duplication. Algorithm 5 describes the detailed protocol.
For the duplicated objects, the protocol replaces their object id with a random value, and its worst score with a large number Z. For the new encrypted items that S 2 replaced (line 20), E(Î i ) = (EHL(ô i ), E( W i ), E( B i )), we show in the following that E( W i ) is indeed a new encryption of the permuted E(W π (π(j)) ) for some j ∈ [l]. As we can see, the E( W i ) is permuted by S 2 's random π , i.e. E( W π (i) ) (see line 27). Hence, it follows that:
In particular, from Algorithm 5, we can see that Equation (2) holds due to line 30, Equation (3) holds since line 26 and 28, Equation (4) holds due to line 25, and Equation (5) holds because of line 8. On the other hand, for the duplicated items that S 1 has changed from line 20 to 22, by the homomorphic operations of S 1 at line 30, we have
Since Z is a very large enough number, this randomly generated objects definitely do not appear in the top-k list after sorting.
Secure Update
At each depth d, we need to update the current list of objects with the latest global worst/best scores. At a high level, S 1 has to update the encrypted list T from the state T d−1 (previous depth) to T d , and appends the new encrypted items at this depth. Let L d be the list of encrypted items with the encrypted worst/best scores S 1 get at depth d. Specifically, for each encrypted item E(I i ) ∈ T d−1 and each E(I j ) ∈ L d at depth d, we update I i 's worst score by adding the worst from I j and replace its best score with I j 's best score if I i = I j since the worst score for I j is the in-depth worst score and best score for I j is the most updated best score. If I i = I j , we then simply append E(I j ) with its scores to the list. Finally, we get the fresh T d after depth d. We describe the SecUpdate protocol in Algorithm 6.
Security
In our construction, we assume that HMAC is a Pseudo-Random Function, which is a keyed function such that no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) running adversary can distinguish from a truly random function with non-negligible probability [27] . In addition, we use the Paillier and DJ encryption schemes, which are secure against Chosen-Plaintext-Attack [27] . We first show that the sub-protocols in Section 8 are secure. We formalize the privacy between the semi-honest adversaries S 1 and S 2 as follows: Let Π f be a two-party protocol that supports the functionality f during the query processing. Let View 
permute E(I i ) ∈ L d as E(I π(i) ) based on random permutation π.
3:
for each permute E(I π(i) ) do 4: for each E(I j ) ∈ T do 5: let E(W i ), E(B i ) be encrypted score for E (I π(i) ), E(W j ), E(B j ) be encrypted score for E(I j ). compute E(b ij ) ← EHL(I π(i) ) EHL(I j ), send E(b ij ) to S 2 and get E 2 t ij .
6:
. updated worst score 7:
updated best score
8:
set E(W j ), E(B j ) as the updated score for E(I j ).
9:
and maintain E(W i ) for each E(I π(i) ).
10:
update the encrypted worst score to E(W i ) for each E(I π(i) ) (keep the original best score E(B i )).
11:
append the updated E(I π(i) ) to T .
12:
run SecDedup(T ) and get the updated list T . Server S 2
13:
for E(b i ) received from S 1 do
14:
Decrypt to get
At the beginning, S 1 has the encrypted database E(R) and the public key pk, while S 2 holds the public/secret key pk and sk. The privacy for SecQuery query protocol is captured by the following definition:
Definition 9.1 We say that the protocol Π f between S 1 and S 2 privately realizes the functionality f if there exists a pair of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) simulators Sim s 1 and Sim s 2 such that:
Here we formally define the leakage during the query execution. For any query q, suppose there are m number of objects at each depth, then
does not leak the equality relations between objects at any depth in the original database, i.e. the server never knows which objects are same since the server doesn't know the permutation. The two sub-routines EncSort and EncCompare have been proved to be secure in [7, 9] and we refer the proofs from there. Below we show that SecWorst we describe in the section 8.2.1 is secure based on the security definition 9.1. Lemma 9.2 Let Π SecWorst be the protocol between S 1 and S 2 described in Algorithm 3 that privately computes the SecWorst functionality. Then Π SecWorst is secure based on the definition 9.1.
The full proof can be found in Appendix A.1. The security analysis of SecBest, SecDedup, SecUpdate are very similar to the proof above and easy to follow, and we therefore skip them.
Security Analysis for SecQuery. Since our construction supports a more complex query type than searching, the security has to capture the fact that the adversarial servers also get the 'views' from the data and meta-data during the query execution. Therefore, the IND-CQA security model defines a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. More precisely, 1).The challenger C begins by flipping a coin b. 2). A submits two databases R 1 , R 2 with same trace of his choice, then receives one of the encrypted database Enc(R b ). 3). A then submits two queries (q 0 , q 1 ) and receives the token of the query q b . This process goes on until the adversary has submitted polynomially-many queries, and during this process A also gets the additional view from the query mechanism (top-k in this case) for each token. 4). Finally A is challenged to output the bit b. We say the scheme is IND-CQA if A cannot output the correct bit with probability non-negligibly different from 1/2. As we discuss in the previous section, the adversary learns a small leakage function or result trace (introduced in [13] ) during the query execution. Note that the leakage for a query is the information we're willing to reveal to the servers. Like most of the the IND-CQA secure searchable encryption schemes, such as [30, 13, 11, 7] , our query protocol reveals the query pattern, which reveals whether two tokens were for the same query. Formally, for q j ∈ q, the query pattern qp(q j ) is a binary vector of length j with a 1 at location i if q j = q i and 0 otherwise. We refer the reader to see the proof in Appendix A.2.
Query Optimization
In this section, we present some optimizations that improve the performance of our protocol. The optimizations are two-fold: 1) we optimize the efficiency of the protocol SecDedup at the expense of some additional privacy leakage, and 2) we propose batch processing of SecDupElim and EncSort to further improve the SecQuery.
Efficient SecDupElim
We now introduce the efficient protocol SecDupElim that provides similar functionality as SecDedup.
Recall that, at each depth, S 1 runs SecDedup to deduplicate m encrypted objects, then after the execution of SecDedup S 1 still receives m items but without duplication. and add these m objects to the list T d when running SecUpdate. Therefore, when we execute the costly sorting algorithm EncSort the size of list to sort has md elements at depth d.
The idea for SecDupElim is that instead of keeping the same number encrypted items m, SecDupElim eliminates the duplicated objects. In this way, the number of encrypted objects get reduced, especially if there're many duplicated objects. The SecDupElim can be obtained by simply changing the SecDedup as follows: in Algorithm 5 at line 18, when S 2 observes that there exist duplicated objects, S 2 only keep one copy of them. The algorithm works exactly the same as before but without performing the line 20-22. We also run SecDupElim instead of SecDedup at line 12 in the SecUpdate. That is, after secure update, we only keep the distinct objects with updated scores. Thus, the number of items to be sorted also decrease. Now by adapting SecDupElim, if there're many duplicated objects appear in the list, we have much fewer encrypted item to sort. On the other hand, SecDupElim leaks additional information to the server S 1 . S 1 learns the uniqueness pattern up d (q i ) at depth d, where up d (q i ) denotes the number of the unique objects appear at current depth d. However, we emphasize that nothing on the objects and their values have been revealed since they're all encrypted. The proof of security for both S 1 and S 2 is very similar to the proof for lemma 9.2 and we skip the proof due to space limit.
Batch Processing for SecQuery
In the query processing SecQuery, we observe that we do not need to run the protocols SecDupElim and EncSort for every depth. Since SecDupElim and EncSort are the most costly protocols in SecQuery, we can perform the batch processing and execute them after a few depths and not at each depth. Our observation is that there is no need to deduplicate repeated objects at each scanned depth. If we perform the SecDupElim after certain depths of scanning, then the repeated objects will be eliminated, and those distinct encrypted objects with updated worst and best scores will be sorted by running EncSort. The protocol will remain correct. We introduce a parameter p such that p ≥ k. The parameter p specifies where we need to run the SecDupElim and EncSort in the SecQuery protocol. That is, the server S 1 runs the SecQuery with S 2 the same as in Algorithm 2 except that, every p depths, we run line 8-11 in Algorithm 2 to check if the algorithm could halt. Moreover, compared to the optimization from SecDupElim, we show that the batching strategy provides more privacy than just running the SecDupElim alone. For query q, assuming that we compute the scores over m attributes. Recall that the up p (q) at depth p has been revealed to S 1 while running SecDupElim, therefore, after the first depth, in the worst case, S 1 learns that the objects at the first depth is the same object. To prevent this worst case leakage, we perform SecDupElim every p depth. Then S 1 learns there're p distinct object in the worst case. After p depth, the probability that S 1 can correctly locate those distinct encrypted objects' positions in the table is P r ≤ 1 (p!) m . This decreases fast for bigger p. However, in practice this leakage is very small as many distinct objects appear every p depth. Even though S 1 has some probability that can guess the distinct objects' location, the object id and their scores have not been revealed since they're all encrypted. The proof of security is very similar to the proof of lemma 9.2 and therefore we skip it due to space limit. In addition, we can of course replace the SecDupElim with the original SecDedup in the batch processing for better privacy but at the cost of some efficiency.
Computational Complexity. We analyze the computation complexity for the query execution. Suppose the client chooses m attributes for the query, therefore at each depth there are m objects. At depth d, it takes S 1 Ø(m) for executing SecWorst, Ø(md) for executing SecBest, Ø(m 2 ) for SecDedup, and Ø(m 2 d) for the SecUpdate. The complexities for S 2 are similar. In addition, the EncSort has time overhead Ø(m log 2 m); however, we can further reduce to Ø(log 2 m) by adapting parallelism (see [7] ). On the other hand, the SecDupElim only takes O(u 2 ), where u is the number of distinct objects at this depth. Notice that most of the computations are multiplication (homomorphic addition), therefore, the cost of query processing is relatively small.
Top-k Join
We would like to briefly mention that our technique can be also extended to compute top-k join queries over multiple encrypted relations. Given a set of relations, R 1 , . . . , R L , each tuple in R i is associated with some score that gives it a rank within R i . The top-k join query joins R 1 to R L and produces the results ranked on a total score. The total score is computed according to some function, F , that combines individual scores. We consider only (i.e.equi-join) conditions in this paper. Similarly, the score function F we consider in this paper is also a linear combination over the attributes from the joining relations. A possible SQL-like join query example is as follows: Q1 = SELECT * FROM A,B,C WHERE A.1=B.1 and B.2=C.3 ORDER BY A.1+B.2+C.4 STOP AFTER k; where A, B and C are three relations and A.1, B.1, B.2, C.3, C.4 are attributes on these relations. Our idea is to design a secure join operator, denoted as sec , such that the server S 1 obliviously joins the relations based on the received token. S 1 has to invoke a protocol with S 2 to get the resulting joined results that meet the join condition. The idea is similar to the technique from above and we leave the full description in the Appendix B. 
Experiments
To evaluate the performance of our protocols, we conducted a set of experiments using real and synthetic datasets. We used the HMAC-SHA-256 as the pseudo-random function (PRF) for the EHL and EHL + encoding, a 128-bit security for the Pailliar and DJ encryption, and all experiments are implemented using C++. We implement the scheme SecTopK = (Enc, Token, SecQuery), including all the protocols SecWorst, SecBest, EncSort, and EncCompare and their optimizations. We run our experiments on a 24 core machine, who serves as the cloud, running Scientific Linux with 128GB memory and 2.9GHz Intel Xeon.
DataSets. We use the following real world dataset downloaded from UCI Machine Learning Repository [31] . insurance: a benchmark dataset that contains 5822 customers' information on an insurance company and we extracted 13 attributes from the original dataset. diabetes: a patients' dataset containing 101767 patients' records (i.e. data objects), where we extracted 10 attributes. PAMAP: a physical activity monitoring dataset that contains 376416 objects, and we extracted 15 attributes. We also generated synthetic datasets synthetic with 10 attributes that takes values from Gaussian distribution and the number of records are varied between 5 thousands to 1 million.
Evaluation of the Encryption Setup
We implemented both the EHL and the efficient EHL + . For EHL, to minimize the false positives, we set the parameters as L = 23 and s = 5, where L is the size of the EHL and s is the number of the secure hash functions. For EHL + , we choose the number of secure hash function HMAC in EHL + to be s = 5, and, as discussed in the previous section, we obtained negligible false positive rate in practice. The encryption Enc is independent of the characteristics of the dataset and depends only on the size. Thus, we generated datasets such that the number of the objects range from 0.1 to 1 million. We compare the encryptions using EHL and EHL + . After sorting the scores for each attribute, the encryption for each item can be fully parallelized. Therefore, when encrypting each dataset, we used 64 threads on the machine that we discussed before. Figure 3 shows that, both in terms of time and space, the cost of database encryption Enc is reasonable and scales linearly to the size of the database. Clearly, EHL + has less time and space overhead. For example, it only takes 54 seconds to encrypt 1 million records using EHL + . The size is also reasonable, as the encrypted database only takes 111 MB using EHL
+ . Figure 4 also shows the encryption time and size overhead for the real dataset that we used. Finally, we emphasize that the encryption only incurs a one-time off-line construction overhead. 
Query Processing Performance
Query Evaluation and Methodology
We evaluate the performance of the secure query processing and their optimizations that we discussed before. In particular, we use the query algorithm without any optimization but with full privacy, denoted as Qry F; the query algorithm running SecDupElim instead of SecDedup at every depth, denoted as Qry E; and the one using the batching strategies, denoted as Qry Ba. We evaluate the query processing performance using all the datasets and use EHL + to encrypt all of the object ids. Notice that the performance of the NRA algorithm depends on the distribution of the dataset among other things. Therefore, to present a clear and simple comparison of the different methods, we measure the average time per depth for the query processing, i.e.
T D , where T is the total time that the program spends on executing a query and D is the total number of depths the program scanned before halting. In most of our experiments the value of D ranges between a few hundred and a few thousands. For each query, we randomly choose the number of attributes m that are used for the ranking function ranging from 2 to 8, and we also vary k between 2 and 20. The ranking function F that we use is the sum function. 
Qry F evaluation
We report the query processing performance without any query optimization. Figure 5 shows Qry F query performance. The results are very promising considering that the query is executed completely on encrypted data. For a fixed number of attributes m = 3, the average time is about 1.30 seconds for the largest dataset synthetic running top-20 queries. When fixing k = 5, the average time per depth for all the dataset is below 1.20 seconds. As we can see that, for fixed m, the performance scales linearly as k increases. Similarly, the query time also linearly increases as m gets larger for fixed k.
Qry E evaluation
The experiments show that the SecDupElim improves the efficiency of the query processing. Figure 6 shows the querying overhead for exactly the same setting as before. Since Qry E eliminates all the duplicated the items for each depth, Qry E has been improved compared to the Qry F above. As k increases, the performance for Qry E executes up to 5 times faster than Qry F when k increase to 20. On the other hand, fixing k = 5, the performance of Qry E can execute up to around 7 times faster than Qry F as m grows to 20. In general, the experiments show that Qry E effectively speed up the query time 5 to 7 times over the basic approach.
Qry Ba evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of batching optimization for the Qry Ba queries. Figure 7 shows the query performance of the Qry Ba for the same settings as the previous experiments. The experiments show that the batching technique further improves the performance. In particular, for fixed batching parameter p = 150, i.e. every 150 depths we perform SecDupElim and EncSort in the SecQuery, and we vary our k from 2 to 20. Compared to the Qry E, the average time per depth for all of the datasets have been further improved. For example, when k = 2, the average time for the largest dataset synthetic is reduced to 74.5 milliseconds, while for Qry F it takes more than 500 milliseconds . For diabetes, the average time is reduced to 53 milliseconds when k = 2 and 123.5 milliseconds when k increases to 20. As shown in figure 7a , the average time linearly increases as k gets larger. In Figure 7c , We further evaluate the parameter p. Ranging p from 200 to 550, the experiments show that the proper p can be chosen for better query performance. In general, for different dataset, there are different p's that can achieve the best query performance. When p gets larger, the number of calls for EncSort and SecDupElim are reduced, however, the performance for these two protocols also slow down as there're more encrypted items. We finally compare the three queries' performance. Figure 8 shows the query performance when fixing k = 5, m = 3, and p = 500. Clearly, as we can see, Qry Ba significantly improves the performance compared to Qry F. For example, compared to Qry F, the average running time is roughly 15 times faster for PAMAP.
Conclusion
This paper proposes the first complete IND-CQA secure scheme that executes top-k ranking queries over encrypted databases in the cloud. First, we describe a secure probabilistic data structure called encrypted hash list (EHL) that allows a cloud server to homomorphically check equality between two objects without learning anything about the original objects. Then, by adapting the well-known NRA algorithm, we propose a number of secure protocols that allow efficient top-k queries execution over encrypted data. The protocols proposed can securely compute the best/worst ranking scores and deduplication of the replicated objects. Moreover, the protocols in this paper are stand-alone which means the protocols can be used for other applications besides the secure top-k query problem. We also provide a clean and formal security analysis of our proposed methods where we explicitly state the leakage of various schemes. The scheme has been proved to be secure under the IND-CQA security definition and the scheme is experimentally evaluated using real-world datasets which show the scheme is efficient and practical.
Query Token: A 1 submits two queries q 1 1 and q 1 2 , then receives the query token Token(q 1 b ). A 1 cannot distinguish the tokens as the tokens are indistinguishable due to the pseudo-random permutation P . Then A 1 runs top-k query processing SecQuery with A 2 , and gets the encrypted top-k results. During the SecQuery, A 1 gets the View A 1 and A 2 gets the view View A 2 after running the protocol. As we previously showed, the privacy of A 1 and A 2 are protected by the underlying secure protocols. Therefore, by seeing the encrypted results A 1 doesn't learn anything from them. After submitting polynomial pairs of queries {q
}, A has to guess the bit b. A 1 still cannot distinguish by seeing many encrypted results as the encryptions reveals no information besides the halting depth, and so does A 2 . Finally, A = (A 1 , A 2 ) cannot output the correct bit with probability non-negligible different from 1/2, therefore, the scheme SecT opk is secure under the IND-CQA model.
B Secure Join B.1 Secure Top-k Join
We provide a description of the secure top-k join in this section. Since a join operator is implemented in most system as a dyadic (2-way) operator, we describe the secure top-k operator as a binary join operator between two relations R 1 and R 2 . Consider an authorized client that wants to join two encrypted relations and get the top-k based on a join condition. Assume that each tuple in R i has m i many attributes and each R i have n i many tuples for i = {1, 2}. Furthermore, denote o i j be the jth objects in R i and let o i j .x k be the kth attribute value.
B.2 Encryption Setup for Multiple databases
Consider a set of relations R 1 and R 2 . The encryption setup is similar as the top-k for one relation.
The difference is that since we have multiple relations on different data we cannot assign a global object identifier for each the objects in different relations. The difference here is that, in addition to encrypting an object id with EHL, we encrypt the attribute value using EHL since the join condition generated from the client is to join the relations based on the attribute values. Therefore, we can compare the equality between different records based on their attributes. The encryption Enc(R 1 , R 2 ) is given in Algorithm 7. 
Generate a key K for the Pseudo-Random Permutation P , and permutes the encrypted attributes based on P , i.e. set E(O i j ) = E(s P (K,1) ), ..., E(s P (K,mi) ) . The encrypted relation E(R i ) does not reveal anything besides the size. The proof is similar to the proof in Theorem 6.1.
B.3 Query Token
Consider a client that wants to run query a SQL-like top-k join as follows: Q = SELECT * FROM R1, R2 WHERE R1.A = R2.B ORDER BY R1.C + R1.D STOP AFTER k; where A, C are attributes in R 1 and B, D are attributes in R 2 . The client first requests the key K for the P , then computes (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) 
B.4 Query Processing for top-k join
In this section, we introduce the secure top-k join operator sec . We first introduce some notation that we use in the query processing algorithm. For a receiving token t Q that is described in Section B.4, let the join condition be JC = E(R 1 ).t 1 = E(R 2 ).t 2 , and the score function Score = E(R 3 ).
, let E(x it 1 ) and E(x it 3 ) be the t 1 -th and t 3 -th encrypted attribute. Similarly, let E(x jt 2 ) and E(x jt 4 ) be the t 2 -th and t 4 -th encrypted attribute for each E(O 2 j ) in E(R 2 ). In addition, let E(X) be a vector of encryptions, i.e. E(X) = (E(x 1 ), ..., E(x s )). For E(X), denote the randomization function Rand as below:
Rand(E(X), R) = (E(x 1 ) · E(r 1 ), ..., E(x n ) · E(r n )) = (E(x 1 + r 1 ), ..., E(x n + r n )) where the random vector R = (r 1 , ..., r n ) ∈ Z n N with each r i is a random value in Z N . This function is similar to the function Rand in Algorithm 5 and is used to homomorphically blind the original data.
In general, the procedure for query processing includes the following steps: 1. Perform the join on E(R 1 ) and E(R 2 ). i Receiving the token, S 1 runs the protocol with S 2 to generate all possible joined tuples from two relations and homomorphically computes the encrypted scores. ii After getting all the joined tuples, S 1 runs SecFilter (see Algorithm 9) , which is a protocol with S 2 to eliminate the tuples that do not meet the join condition. S 1 finally produce the encrypted join tuples together with their scores. 2. EncSort: after securely joining all the databases, S 1 then runs the encrypted sorting protocol to get the top-k results.
−1 π(i)
), E pk s (R π(i) ).
15: for remaining items do 16: Generate random γ i ∈ Z * N , and Γ i ∈ Z m N .
17:
E(s i ) ← E(s π(i) ) γ i and E( X i ) ← Rand E(X π(i) ), Γ i
18:
Set E(õ i ) = E(s i ), E( X i ) 19:
compute the following using pk s :
20: Sends the E(õ i ) and E pk s ( r i ), E pk s ( R i ) to S 1 Server S 1 : 21: for each E(õ i ) = (E(s), E( X i )) and E pk s ( r i ), E pk s ( R i ) do 22:
use sks to decrypt E( r i ) as r i , E( R i ) as R i . /*homomorphically de-blind*/ 23: compute E(s i ) ← E(s i ) r i and E(X i ) ← Rand(E( X i ), − R i ) Set E(o i ) = E(s i ), E(X i ).
/*Suppose there're l tuples left*/ 24: Output the list E(o 1 ) ... E(o l ).
The main sec is fully described in Algorithm 8. As mentioned earlier, since all the attributes are encrypted, we cannot simply use the traditional join strategy. The merge-sort or hash based join cannot be applied here since all the tuples have been encrypted by a probabilistic encryption. Our idea for S 1 to securely produce the joined result is as follows: S 1 first combines all the tuples from two databases (say, using nested loop) by initiating the protocol SecCombine. After that, S 1 holds all the combined tuples together with the scores. The joined tuple have m 1 + m 2 many attributes (or user selected attributes). Those tuples that meet the equi-join condition JC are successfully joined together with the encrypted scores that satisfy the Score function. However, for those tuples that do not meet the JC, their encrypted scores are homomorphically computed as E(0) and their joined attributes are all E(0) as well. S 1 holds all the possible combined tuples. Next, the SecFilter eliminates all of those tuples that do not satisfy JC. It is easy to see that similar techniques from SecDupElim can be applied here. At the end of the protocol, both S 1 and S 2 only learn the final number of the joined tuples that meet JC. Of course, if we don't want to leak the number of tuples that meet JC, we can use a similar technique from SecDedup, that is, S 2 generates some random tuples and large enough random scores for the tuples to not satisfy JC. In this way, nothing else has been leaked to the servers. It is worth noting that the technique sketched above not only can be used for top-k join, but for any equality join can be applied here.
B.4.1 Performance Evaluation
We conduct an experiments under the same environment as in Section 12. We use synthetic datasets to evaluate our sec-join operator sec : we uniformly generate R 1 with 5K tuples and 10 attributes, and R 2 with 10K tuples and 15 attributes. Since the server runs the oblivious join that we discuss before over the encrypted databases, the performance of the sec does not depend on the parameter k. We test the effect of the joined attributes in the experiments. We vary the total number of the attribute m joined together from two tables. Figure 9 shows performance when m ranges from 5 to 20. Our operator sec is generically designed for joining any attributes between two relations. In practice, one would be only interested in joining two tables using primary-key-to-foreign-key join or foreign-key-to-primary-key join. Our methods can be easily generalized to those joins. In addition, one can also pre-sort the attributes to be ranked and save computations in the sec processing. We leave this as the future work of this paper.
B.5 Related Works on Secure Join
Many works have proposed for executing equi-joins over encrypted data. One recent work [36] proposed a privacy-preserving join on encrypted data. Their work mainly designed for the private join operation, therefore cannot support the top-k join. In addition, in [36] , although the actual values for the joined records are not revealed, the server learns some equality pattern on the attributes if records are successfully joined. In addition, [36] uses bilinear pairing during their query processing, thus it might cause high computation overhead for large datasets. CryptDB [37] is a well-known system for processing queries on encrypted data. MONOMI [42] is based on CryptDB with a special focus on efficient analytical query processing. [28] adapts the deterministic proxy re-encryption to provide the data confidentiality. The approaches using deterministic encryption directly leak the duplicates and, as a result, the equality patterns to the adversarial servers. [46] propose a secure query system SDB that protects the data confidentiality by decomposing the sensitive data into shares and can perform secure joins on shares of the data. However, it is unclear whether the system can perform top-k queries over the shares of the data. Other solutions such as Order-preserving encryption (OPE) [8, 4] can also be adapted to secure top-k join, however, it is commonly not considered very secure on protecting the ranks of the score as the the adversarial server directly learns the order of the attributes.
